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BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES: REALITIES 
OF DE FACTO DEPORTATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMPARISONS TOWARD PROPOSING A SOLUTION 
[W]e are a nation of immigrants who, through citizenship, seek to fully 
embrace all that America is and hopes to be.  Today, as in decades past for 
many immigrants, citizenship represents the ultimate in attaining the American 
dream.  Citizenship acknowledges the exceptional value of the immigrants and 
bestows fuller acceptance into American society.  Through naturalization the 
immigrant is transformed from an “alien” into an American; no longer the 
stranger, but now an esteemed family member free to assert all the rights and 
bear all the responsibilities of American citizenship.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Saul Arellano is an American citizen.2  His mother, Elvira Arellano, 
arrived in the United States illegally in 1997 from Mexico and gave birth to 
Saul shortly thereafter. 3  In 2006, despite two previous deportation deferrals, 
Elvira was ordered deported.4  She immediately took refuge in a Chicago 
church to avoid being separated from her son,5 and she quickly became an 
activist “for illegal immigrant parents as she defied her deportation order and 
spoke out from her sanctuary.”6 
On August 19, 2007, Elvira had just spoken at an immigration rally when 
she was arrested and deported to Mexico.7  She left her son in the care of 
Reverend Walter Coleman from the Chicago church.8  Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement has defended its actions, saying that Elvira, who had 
previously been convicted of using a false identity and using someone else’s 
 
 1. John S. Cummins, Naturalization and Birthright Citizenship Should Be Encouraged, in 
IMMIGRATION: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 188, 189 (Mary E. Williams ed., 2004). 
 2. Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (N.D. Ill. 2006); see also Gretchen 
Ruethling, Chicago Woman’s Stand Stirs Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at 
A10. 
 3. Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 760. 
 4. Id. at 762. 
 5. Elliot Spagat, U.S. Deports Sanctuary Movement’s Symbol, USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 2007, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-08-19-2962407204_x.htm. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Sara Olkon & Bob Secter, Deporting Mother Inflames Emotions, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 21, 
2007, at 1. 
 8. Spagat, supra note 5. 
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social security number, was a criminal fugitive living in the United States 
illegally.9 
In response to her deportation order, Elvira’s priest filed suit on behalf of 
Saul alleging that the removal order was a constructive removal action against 
Saul that violated his Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights.10  The court 
acknowledged that Saul “possesses the constitutional right . . . to reside in the 
United States,” and “[i]nherent within this right of citizenship is the 
‘independent right to not be deported.’”11  However, the court specified that 
“this particular right of citizenship is personal and cannot be imputed to non-
citizens,”12 essentially declaring that Saul’s citizenship status alone cannot 
save his mother from deportation. 
Although the court recognized that “any separation of a child from its 
mother is a hardship,” it reasoned that this hardship should not allow “an 
otherwise unqualified mother to append the children’s right to remain in the 
United States.”13  The law does not grant citizen family members of illegal 
aliens a legal right to prevent deportation.14  Each court that has addressed the 
issue of whether a removal order issued against an alien parent violates the 
constitutional rights of a citizen-child has held that removal is not 
unconstitutional, “even if that removal constitutes the ‘constructive’ or ‘de 
facto deportation’ of a citizen-child.”15  The removal of the illegal alien parent 
does not violate the child’s constitutional rights since the “citizen child remains 
free to exercise his right to live in the United States.”16  The court subsequently 
concluded that because Elvira’s removal order would “not have any legal 
effect on Saul’s right to remain in the United States,” the removal order should 
be executed as ordered.17 
Coleman v. United States represents the typical case in which a citizen-
child is trying to prevent the deportation of his illegal alien parent.  The 
problem with deporting illegal residents with American-born children is that 
the children have a constitutional right to U.S. citizenship, acquired simply by 
virtue of having been born within U.S. borders.18  As a consequence, the 
children are legal citizens and cannot be forced to leave.  However, the 
 
 9. Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 760. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 766 (citing Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1977) and Oforji v. 
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 767 (quoting Oforji, 354 F.3d at 617–18). 
 14. Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 767 (quoting Oforji, 354 F.3d at 617–18). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 767–68. 
 17. Id. at 768. 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also infra Part I (discussing birthright citizenship 
in the United States). 
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deportation of the parent often results in de facto deportation of the citizen-
children, a practice which many argue contradicts the constitutional guarantee 
of birthright citizenship and the inherent rights associated with American 
citizenship. 
This Comment takes the position that the current U.S. immigration policy 
of deporting illegal immigrants with little regard to the citizenship status of 
their children directly contradicts the ideals of birthright citizenship, 
particularly with regard to children of illegal immigrant parents.  The inherent 
rights of these citizen-children simply cannot be respected and upheld under a 
system that forces them to choose between either exercising their right to 
remain in the United States or staying with their parent and being deported.  
Birthright citizenship for children of illegal immigrant parents must be 
abandoned in favor of a system that does not require such a difficult and 
contradictory choice. 
Undoubtedly, these problems are not uniquely American.  To better 
resolve these supposed contradictions between law and policy, an international 
perspective is imperative and practical.  Thus, this Comment discusses 
birthright citizenship from an international perspective, providing a 
comparative analysis between the United States’ approach toward birthright 
citizenship and the approach taken by other western democratic nations.  Part I 
discusses the origins of birthright citizenship in general and the problem of 
illegal immigrant births in the United States, including information on illegal 
immigrant birthrates, a summary of the conflicting schools of thought on the 
subject of birthright citizenship, and pending congressional responses.  Part II 
discusses de facto deportation and the relative case law and legislation.  Part III 
encompasses the comparative analysis and includes an examination of the 
philosophical and practical approaches to birthright citizenship taken in 
Canada, Australia, Ireland, and France.  Finally, Part IV attempts to propose a 
solution to resolve the contradiction between U.S. law, which grants birthright 
citizenship to the children of illegal immigrants, and U.S. policy, which 
encourages the deportation of illegal immigrant parents and the inevitable de 
facto deportation of the citizen-child. 
I.  BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States confers both jus sanguinis19 citizenship and jus soli20 
citizenship.  Jus sanguinis confers citizenship to any child whose parent is a 
citizen,21 and jus soli confers citizenship to anyone born within a state’s 
 
 19. Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), § 301(c)-(e), (g)-(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)-(e), 
(g)-(h) (2006). 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)-(b). 
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 880 (8th ed. 2004). 
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territory.22  The jus soli doctrine as used in the United States originates from 
English common law, which conferred citizenship upon any person born 
within its boundaries.23  Jus soli, or birthright citizenship, was incorporated 
into U.S. law with the Civil Rights Act of 186624 and ultimately the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.25  Thus, “every person born within the 
dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever the situation of his 
parents, was a natural-born citizen.”26 
A. The Statistics of Illegal Immigration and Birthright Citizenship 
The practice of birthright citizenship in the United States has resulted in a 
staggering number of U.S. citizens born to illegal immigrant parents.  
According to the Center for Immigration Studies, approximately “383,000 
children are born each year to illegal alien mothers, accounting for nearly 10 
percent of all births in the United States.”27  The Federation for American 
Immigration Reform claims that, of these, almost half are born to illegal 
immigrants who come to the United States “to give birth so their children will 
be American citizens.”28  Some estimates indicate that “about 3.1 million 
American children have at least one parent who is an illegal immigrant.”29  In 
2007, “[a]bout two-thirds of the children of the illegal immigrants detained in 
immigration raids” were born in the United States, and “at least 13,000 
American children have seen one or both parents deported in the past two 
years” after immigration raids in factories and neighborhoods.30 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655–66 (1898); see also Jonathan C. 
Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution, and Application of Birthright 
Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667, 671–73 (1995) (discussing birthright 
citizenship under English law).  For other introductory overviews of birthright citizenship in 
English common law, see ALEXANDER PORTER MORSE, A TREATISE ON CITIZENSHIP, BY BIRTH 
AND BY NATURALIZATION (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881), and Charles Wood, Losing 
Control of America’s Future—The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 504–06 (1999). 
 24. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981–1982 (2000)). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 26. FREDERICK VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1904) (citing Lynch v. 
Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583 (N.Y. Ch. 1844)). 
 27. Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and the Meaning of Sovereignty: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (statement of Rep. John Hostettler, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims). 
 28. Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 29. Julia Preston, Case of Mother Torn from Baby Reflects Immigration Quandary, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2007, at A1. 
 30. Id. 
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With such high numbers of American-born children with illegal immigrant 
parents, policymakers have struggled to decide how to deal with illegal 
immigrants while also respecting the citizenship status and familial needs of 
their citizen-children.  Incidents similar to the case of Elvira Arellano represent 
the difficulties that lawmakers face in forming a workable approach toward 
illegal immigration.  More recently, in October 2007, an illegal immigrant 
mother was detained while nursing her nine-month-old baby, who was born in 
the United States.31  Immigration and Customs Enforcement responded to 
subsequent outcries over her detention by issuing new written guidelines 
establishing how agents should treat single parents, pregnant or nursing 
women, and other immigrants with special child or family care responsibilities 
who are arrested in raids.32 
B. Birthright Citizenship: The Debate 
1. Maintain Birthright Citizenship for Children of Illegal Immigrants and 
Eliminate De Facto Deportation 
Proponents of birthright citizenship contend that denying or restricting 
birthright citizenship for children of illegal immigrants would create grave 
social problems, resulting in a “new and artificial barrier between the 
‘accepted’ citizens and the ‘unaccepted’ citizens of our nation” that would 
“create an unhealthy and destructive divide within America and add to the 
number of those who feel excluded from the greater society.”33  Ending 
birthright citizenship for these children “would create a new series of practical 
problems for citizens and government alike.”34  As one commentator notes: 
Native-born Americans would have to prove their parents’ citizenship in order 
to enjoy the rights and privileges of their own citizenship.  This in turn would 
introduce new possibilities for racial and ethnic discrimination.  A stateless 
class would be created—the first native-born non-citizens to grow up in 
America since the children of slaves before the Civil War.35 
Without a system of birthright citizenship, the United States, a country with 
high immigration rates, would become “a hereditary caste of permanent 
aliens.”36 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Cummins, supra note 1, at 190. 
 34. Id. at 191. 
 35. Id. 
 36. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy, in 
FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 119, 128 (T. Alexander 
Alenikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000) (quoting Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding 
Children Born in the United States to Illegal Alien Parents: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
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Proponents of birthright citizenship also offer practical arguments in favor 
of continuing the current law.  They argue that immigrants “access social 
welfare services at much lower rates than U.S.-born citizens,” and 
intergenerational welfare dependency between immigrant parents and children 
is unsubstantiated, negating arguments that focus on taxpayer burdens.37  
Additionally, illegal immigrants “tend to have above-average levels of 
education and occupational skills in comparison with their homeland 
populations,” since “[t]he very poor and the unemployed seldom migrate.”38  
Illegal immigrants are “positively self-selected in terms of ambition and 
willingness to work.”39 
Activists for illegal immigrants also argue that strict policies calling for the 
deportation of illegal immigrant mothers violate the constitutional rights of 
their citizen-children, destroy the family, and result in negative consequences 
for their children.  In fact, courts deciding issues of de facto deportation have 
acknowledged that “the longer [that] children [of illegal immigrant parents] 
have lived in the United States, the greater the hardship to them of being sent 
back to their parent’s native country.”40  Thus, many argue that not only should 
the practice of birthright citizenship be maintained, but deportation of the 
illegal immigrant parents of citizen-children should end.41 
2. Abolition of Birthright Citizenship for Children of Illegal Immigrants 
Opponents of birthright citizenship for children of illegal immigrants 
generally utilize three arguments in favor of abolishing the practice.42  First, it 
bestows citizenship on some whose “only tie to the society is the geographic 
accident of their place of birth.”43  Second, jus soli citizenship encourages 
people from developing nations to enter illegally and give birth to their 
children,44 giving rise to so-called “anchor babies.”45  Anti-immigrant groups, 
 
on Immigration and Claims and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 109 (1995) (statement of Gerald L. Neuman, Professor, Columbia 
University Law School)). 
 37. Priscilla Huang, Which Babies are Real Americans?, TOMPAINE.COM, Feb. 20, 2007, 
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2007/02/20/which_babies_are_real_americans.php. 
 38. ALEJANDRO PORTES & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, IMMIGRANT AMERICA: A PORTRAIT 10 
(2d ed. 1996). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 620 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 41. For a more extensive criticism of de facto deportation, see discussion infra Part II.B. 
 42. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF & DOUGLAS KLUSMEYER, CITIZENSHIP POLICIES FOR AN 
AGE OF MIGRATION 11 (2000). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  The authors note, however, that there is “scant evidence” to support the claim that 
illegal immigrants enter the country solely to give birth.  Id.  They immigrate to “obtain work, 
join family, or flee persecution or civil strife.”  Id. 
 45. Judith Bernstein-Baker, Citizenship in a Restrictionist Era: The Mixed Messages of 
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such as the Federation of American Immigration Reform (FAIR), argue that 
these children born to illegal immigrant parents “create a drain on the 
country’s social service programs.”46  They contend that the large numbers of 
births by non-U.S. citizens in American hospitals is indisputable, and “its 
impact is huge.”47  Third, automatic birthright citizenship may influence states 
to “adopt tougher rules on family unification,” namely, by deporting the illegal 
immigrant parents of citizen-children.48 
Opponents of birthright citizenship for children of illegal immigrants argue 
that “it is simply morally perverse to reward law-breaking by conferring the 
valued status of citizenship.”49  Such a policy “makes a mockery of 
citizenship”50 and allows illegal immigrants and their children to 
“automatically jump ahead of millions of other foreigners patiently waiting in 
line abroad for the chance to come to the United States in proper, legal 
fashion.”51  One commentator argues that withholding birthright citizenship 
from “anchor babies” “would no more be ‘blaming’ or ‘punishing’ innocent 
children than an airline would be blaming or punishing the children of 
hijackers by not awarding them Frequent Flier mileage for unscheduled flights 
to Havana.”52  Instead of “encouraging foreigners to come to the United States 
solely to enable them to confer U.S. citizenship on their future children,” the 
United States should “stop [this] abuse of hospitality . . . by changing the rule 
on citizenship.”53  American-born children should not be forced to make an 
“ugly choice” between either staying in the United States without their parents 
or facing de facto deportation to their parents’ home country.54 
C. Pending Congressional Responses 
Congress has struggled to resolve the debate concerning birthright 
citizenship and the rights of the American-born children of illegal immigrants.  
In January 2007, Representative Elton Gallegly from California reintroduced 
the Citizenship Reform Act, House Bill 133,55 and in April 2007, 
 
Federal Policies, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 367, 371 (2007). 
 46. Huang, supra note 37. 
 47. Bonnie Erbe, Birthright Citizenship Should Be Repealed, in IMMIGRATION: OPPOSING 
VIEWPOINTS, supra note 1, at 184, 186. 
 48. ALEINIKOFF & KLUSMEYER, supra note 42, at 11. 
 49. Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 127. 
 50. Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring) (quoting 
John McCaslin, Inside the Beltway: Rotund Tourists, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2002, at A7). 
 51. Erbe, supra note 47, at 186–87. 
 52. Id. at 186. 
 53. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 621 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 153 CONG. REC. H115 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2007). 
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Representative Nathan Deal proposed House Bill 1940,56 both of which would 
have amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to deny birthright 
citizenship to children of parents who are neither citizens nor permanent 
resident aliens.57  In November 2007, Representative Tom Tancredo 
introduced House Bill 4192,58 which contained a provision that also would 
have amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide that a child 
would not be a U.S. citizen unless at the time of the child’s birth at least one of 
the child’s parents is a citizen or lawful permanent resident alien.59  In a 
markedly different approach, in January 2007, Representative Jose Serrano 
from New York introduced House Bill 213,60 which would provide 
discretionary authority to an immigration judge to determine that an alien 
parent of a United States citizen-child should not be deported if the deportation 
would be against the best interests of the child.61 
II.  DE FACTO DEPORTATION 
A. Case Law 
As stated above, each court that has addressed the issue of whether a 
removal order issued against an alien parent violates the constitutional rights of 
a citizen-child has held that removal is not unconstitutional, “even if that 
removal constitutes the ‘constructive’ or ‘de facto deportation’ of a citizen 
child.”62  Although courts have acknowledged that “any separation of a child 
 
 56. 153 CONG. REC. H3693 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 2007). 
 57. Citizenship Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong. (2007); Birthright Citizenship 
Act of 2007, H.R. 1940, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 58. 153 CONG. REC. H14,080 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007). 
 59. OVERDUE Immigration Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 4192, 110th Cong. § 201 (2007). 
 60. 153 CONG. REC. H118 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 2007). 
 61. H.R. 213, 110th Cong. (2007).  After the original bill never became law, Serrano 
reintroduced it as H.R. 182 in January 2009. 
 62. Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 767 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (footnote omitted); 
see also Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1986); Marquez-Medina v. INS, 
765 F.2d 673, 676 (7th Cir. 1985); Newton v. INS, 736 F.2d 336, 342–43 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Valadez-Salas v. INS, 721 F.2d 251, 252 (8th Cir. 1983); Aguilar v. INS, 638 F.2d 717, 719 (5th 
Cir. 1981); Delgado v. INS, 637 F.2d 762, 763–64 (10th Cir. 1980); Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 
577 F.2d 589, 594 (9th Cir. 1978) (observing that the argument “that the deportation order would 
amount to a de facto deportation of the child and thus violate the constitutional rights of the 
child . . . has been authoritatively rejected in numerous cases”); Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 
1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977); Enciso-Cardozo v. INS, 504 F.2d 1252, 1253 (2d Cir. 1974); Bill 
Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented Parents, 63 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 35, 40–41 (1988) (noting that citizen children “have not been successful in 
pressing the view that the deportation of their undocumented parents is tantamount to the de facto 
deportation of the child”). 
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from its mother is a hardship,”63 they have reasoned that the removal of the 
illegal alien parent does not violate the child’s constitutional rights, since the 
“citizen child remains free to exercise his right to live in the United States.”64  
Once the child “reaches the age of discretion, . . . she will be free to return and 
make her home in this country,” and her “parents’ deportation will not affect 
her[] right to do so.”65  The Seventh Circuit has held that “the constitutional 
right . . . to exercise a choice of residence, and to leave or stay in the United 
States as one chooses . . . is not always absolute in children.”66 
Courts have also held that an illegal alien parent who has no legal right “to 
remain in the United States may not establish a derivative claim for asylum” by 
arguing that de facto deportation would force hardship on her child.67  The 
Ninth Circuit has reasoned that one of the principal reasons for the rejection of 
de facto deportation of the child as a means to prevent deportation of the illegal 
parent “is that it would permit a wholesale avoidance of immigration laws if an 
alien were to be able to enter the country, have a child shortly thereafter, and 
prevent deportation.”68  The court in Gonzalez-Cuevas v. INS held that alien 
parents “who illegally remain[] in the United States for the occasion of the 
birth of their citizen children” do not derive any “extraordinary rights . . . 
directly or vicariously through their citizen children, to retain their illegally 
acquired residency status in this country.”69 
 
 63. Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 64. Coleman, 454 F. Supp. 2d at 767–68; see also Lopez v. Franklin, 427 F. Supp. 345, 349 
(E.D. Mich. 1977) (rejecting the argument that de facto deportation violated a citizen-child’s 
constitutional rights in part because the child’s departure from the United States was not “the 
necessary result of the government’s actions”). 
 65. Ayala-Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Acosta, 558 F.2d at 
1158 (reasoning that “[t]he right of an American citizen to fix and change his residence is a 
continuing one which he enjoys throughout his life,” and deportation of a citizen-child’s illegal 
immigrant parent “will merely postpone, but not bar” the child’s right to reside in the United 
States). 
 66. Schleiffer v. Meyers, 644 F.2d 656, 662–63 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Perdido v. INS, 420 
F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 1969) (reasoning that “a minor child who is fortuitously born here due 
to his parents’ decision to reside in this country has not exercised a deliberate decision to make 
this country his home, and Congress did not give such a child the ability to confer immigration 
benefits on his parents”) 
 67. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618. 
 68. Urbano de Malaluan v. INS, 577 F.2d 589, 594 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Mendez v. 
Major, 340 F.2d 128, 131–32 (8th Cir. 1965) (holding that “Congress has the power to determine 
the conditions under which an alien may enter and remain in the United States even though the 
conditions may impose a certain amount of hardship upon an alien’s wife or children” (citations 
omitted)). 
 69. 515 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1975). 
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B. De Facto Deportation: A Practical Perspective 
Despite the consensus among U.S. Circuits that any legal claim of de facto 
deportation is without merit, de facto deportation undoubtedly has real, anti-
American consequences in practice.  Undoubtedly, scholars on both sides of 
the debate have argued that “‘what is best for the child’” should be the guiding 
principle in determining a workable policy toward citizen-children of illegal 
immigrant parents.70  However, considering that most immigrants today come 
to America because of “desperate poverty, squalor, and unemployment” in 
their own countries,71 sending the child back to the parents’ home country 
seems counterintuitive as a method to achieve “what is best for the child.” 
Additionally, many nations, including westernized and non-westernized, 
democratic and non-democratic, have recognized at some point the right of a 
child to the care and parentage of a family.72  In fact, all but two United 
Nations states73 have acknowledged that the family is “the fundamental group 
of society” and serves as the “natural environment for the growth and well-
being of all its members.”74  Children “particularly . . . should be afforded the 
necessary protection and assistance” of the family, and children “should grow 
up in a family environment” to ensure their “full and harmonious 
development.”75 
Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child obligates party 
states to “undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve his or her 
identity, including nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law 
without unlawful interference.”76  Article 9 requires party states to “ensure that 
a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will, except 
when . . . such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child.”77  
Surprisingly, the United States is one of the two U.N. states who have yet to 
ratify the Convention.78 
 
 70. Marvin P. Dawkins, Rethinking U.S. Immigration Policy, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER 
EDUC., Apr. 27, 2000, at 120. 
 71. PORTES & RUMBAUT, supra note 38, at 9. 
 72. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989); see also infra Part III.D.1 (discussing jus soli and deportation of 
illegal immigrant parents in Ireland). 
 73. The United States has signed, but not ratified, the Convention.  See Office of the U.N. 
High Comm’r for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal Int’l Human Rights 
Treaties (June 9, 2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf; see also Child Rights 
Information Network, Convention on the Rights of the Child, http://www.crin.org/resources/ 
treaties/CRC.asp?catName=International+Treatie (last visited Dec. 15, 2008). 
 74. G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 72, pmbl. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. art. 8. 
 77. Id. art. 9. 
 78. See supra note 73. 
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Not only is there international recognition of a child’s right to familial 
support and care, but traditional American legal and moral principles of the 
sanctity of the family and parental involvement in the care and rearing of 
children seem to contradict courts’ unsympathetic view of de facto 
deportation.79  Courts have acknowledged that “[t]o protect the unit in [its] 
constitutionally guaranteed right to form and preserve the family is one of the 
basic principles for which organized government is established.”80  One 
commentator argues that “although the word ‘family’ is not found in the U.S. 
Constitution, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the protection 
of private choices about family integrity is a matter of constitutional 
dimension.”81  The relationship between a parent and child “has always been 
recognized as an inherent, natural right, for the protection of which, just as 
much as for the protection of the rights of the individual to life, liberty, and 
pursuit of happiness, our government is formed.”82 
Although the United States has yet to adopt the U.N. Convention and is 
therefore under no U.N. obligation to recognize a child’s right to a consistent 
familial structure, basic principles of fairness and integrity require such an 
approach.  The child may be free to stay in the United States with a relative or 
family friend, but the child’s inevitable need for a family structure will most 
often force him to leave with his deportee parent.  A citizen-child of an illegal, 
deportee parent has two choices, both undesirable.  One such choice “denies 
citizen children their right to remain in the United States, and the other 
 
 79. See David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child 
Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1174–75 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court’s tendency to 
protect “family integrity” and prevent outside influence on the parent-child relationship, and 
arguing that “the Court’s primary approach has been to stress parents’ role in raising their 
children”). 
 80. Lacher v. Venus, 188 N.W. 613, 617 (Wis. 1922); see also Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence “establish[es] 
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the 
family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”).  The Court argues that the 
Wisconsin v. Yoder Court “rested its holding in part on the constitutional right of parents to 
assume the primary role in decisions concerning the rearing of their children.”  Moore, 431 U.S. 
at 503 n.12 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).  Such a constitutional right “is 
recognized because it reflects a ‘strong tradition’ founded on ‘the history and culture of Western 
civilization,’ and because the parental role ‘is now established beyond debate as an enduring 
American tradition.’”  Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232). 
 81. David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child-Centered 
Immigration Law, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58, 58–59 (2006).  Thronson argues that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has long acknowledged that among the liberties protected by the due process 
clause of the constitution is the right to ‘establish a home and bring up children, . . . [a right] 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.’”  Id. at 59 n.4 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); see also Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 n.12 
(quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232). 
 82. Lacher, 188 N.W. at 617. 
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destroys their right to live in an intact family.”83  De facto deportation is real, 
and passively forcing a child to leave the country to retain familial support 
contradicts American notions of the importance of family.  Such a practice also 
undoubtedly affects the citizen-child’s ability to develop crucial, nationhood 
bonds with the United States.84  The “fundamental rights [of] the parent-child 
relationship” should not be “weakened by parents’ lack of immigration status 
or even their imminent deportation.”85 
C. De Facto Deportation: Legislation 
Under current law, the U.S. Attorney General may cancel the deportation 
of an illegal alien parent upon a showing of exceptional hardship and a 
minimum of ten years continuous physical presence in the United States.86  
Simply asserting that deportation would have “a negative impact on the citizen 
child does not itself establish the extreme hardship necessary to cease the 
deportation.”87  The U.S. Attorney General and the Board of Immigration 
Appeals has broad discretion, without much scope for judicial substantive 
review, to define “extreme hardship” and determine situations that qualify as 
an “extreme hardship” on the child.88  This law, however, has been criticized 
as arbitrary, ineffective, and unnecessarily strict.89 
Judge Richard Posner, in his concurring opinion in Oforji v. Ashcroft, 
criticized the “ten-year rule” by arguing that it “has only a tenuous relation to 
the hardship of children whose parent is ordered deported.”90  Posner continues 
 
 83. Thronson, supra note 81, at 80; see also Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 
2003) (stating that despite the hardship that an illegal alien parent must face in choosing whether 
to allow her children to remain in the United States with a guardian or to take them back to her 
home country, “Congress has foreseen such difficult choices, but has opted to leave the choice 
with the illegal immigrant”). 
 84. See Thronson, supra note 81, at 81 (arguing that “removal of citizen children from the 
United States is certain to limit their development of important bonds with their country of 
citizenship”). 
 85. Thronson, supra note 79, at 1197. 
 86. INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006); see also Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 
327 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 2003); Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 87. Michael Robert W. Houston, Note, Birthright Citizenship in the United Kingdom and the 
United States: A Comparative Analysis of the Common Law Basis for Granting Citizenship to 
Children Born of Illegal Immigrants, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 693, 733 (2000). 
 88. Hernandez-Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 1987); Contreras-Buenfil v. INS, 
712 F.2d 401, 402–03 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 89. See Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and 
Marriage?: Immigration Law’s Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 298 (2003) 
(arguing that the prerequisite “that the alien be a person of good moral character” is a requirement 
that is impossible to fulfill for illegal immigrants with a criminal conviction and that subsequent 
court decisions indicate that the “hardship requirement is very difficult to meet”). 
 90. 354 F.3d 609, 620 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring).  At the time, the rule Posner 
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by acknowledging “that the longer the children have lived in the United States, 
the greater the hardship to them of being sent back to their parent’s native 
country,” and the hardship is “made more excruciating the longer they remain 
here and become acclimated to American ways.”91 The ten-year rule is 
“irrational,” since “the parent may have been here for nine years but the child 
[may] have been born eight years ago,” and deportation would still be a great 
hardship for the child, even though the parent might not satisfy the ten-year 
requirement.92 
III.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP IN OTHER WESTERN 
DEMOCRATIC NATIONS 
In determining a workable policy to deal with the American-born children 
of illegal immigrant mothers, lawmakers should examine the policies utilized 
in other western democratic nations facing similar immigration problems.  
Controlling access to automatic citizenship or nationality in modern liberal-
democratic states has generally centered around three approaches: jus soli, jus 
sanguinis, and naturalization through formalized legal procedures, such as 
marriage, adoption, or other specialized circumstances.93  Some argue that in 
countries where jus soli is used to determine citizenship, “the public policy 
toward migrants is one of assimilation.”94  Conversely, in countries where jus 
sanguinis is used to determine citizenship, “the public policy toward migrants 
is one that resists assimilation,” and xenophobia remains a serious problem in 
these areas.95 
Modern states often employ some variation of all three of the primary 
means to satisfy different purposes.96  Whatever the means that nations choose, 
“questions of citizenship are always inextricably bound to larger issues of 
sovereignty, national identity, the framework of political order, and individual 
liberties.”97 
 
was criticizing required seven years continual presence in the United States.  Id.  His criticisms, 
however, are still relevant in the context of the ten-year rule. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Douglas Klusmeyer, Introduction to FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A 
CHANGING WORLD, supra note 36, at 5. 
 94. John D. Snethen, The Evolution of Sovereignty and Citizenship in Western Europe: 
Implications for Migration and Globalization, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 244 (2000). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 242–44. 
 97. Klusmeyer, supra note 93, at 7. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
232 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:219 
A. Canada 
1. History of Jus Soli 
Under current Canadian law,98 jus soli citizenship is conferred on anyone 
born in Canada, regardless of the citizenship status of his parents.99  For 
decades before the passing of the Citizenship Act, the Canadian Parliament 
made little effort to define the status of Canadian citizenship, opting instead to 
rely on English common law.100  In the early 1900s, however, Canada began to 
assert its status as an emerging independent country, rather than as a British 
colony, partly by enacting statutes aimed at defining Canadian citizenship.101  
One of these statutes, the Immigration Act of 1910,102 “placed significant 
restrictions on citizenship,” which allowed Canadian Parliament to control the 
composition of the Canadian population.103  The Immigration Act, in general, 
defines a citizen as a person born in Canada, a British subject living in Canada, 
or a person naturalized in Canada.104  Such restrictive legislation, aimed at 
“achieving a cohesive and loyal population,”105 enabled Canada to 
communicate to other nations its status as an autonomous country106 and assert 
its newly acquired sovereignty.107  In fact, Canadian law explicitly states that 
determinations of citizenship should be “designed and administered in such a 
manner as to promote the domestic and international interests of Canada.”108 
2. Jus Soli Comes Under Fire 
During most of the legal history of Canada, birthright citizenship seemed 
to be an acceptable and virtually undisputed policy that was “never seriously 
 
 98. Citizenship Act, R.S.C., ch. C-29 (1985). 
 99. Id. § 3(1).  Children born to foreign diplomats are an exception.  Donald Galloway, The 
Dilemmas of Canadian Citizenship Law, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 201 (1999), reprinted in FROM 
MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 36, at 82, 85 (citing 
Citizenship Act, R.S.C. ch. C-29, § 3(2)).  Galloway acknowledges that identifying the 
Citizenship Act as the primary source of citizenship law is “controversial” because many credit 
the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the authority on citizenship.  Id. at 84.  
However, Galloway argues that the Charter fails to define citizenship and does not identify 
qualifications for obtaining citizenship.  Id. 
 100. Galloway, supra note 99, at 93. 
 101. Id. at 94. 
 102. Immigration Act, 1910, 9 & 10 Edw. 7, c. 27 (Eng.). 
 103. Galloway, supra note 99, at 94. 
 104. Id. at 95 (citing Immigration Act, 1910, 9 & 10 Edw. 7, c. 27 § 2). 
 105. Id. at 97. 
 106. Id. at 95. 
 107. Id. at 96. 
 108. Ayelet Shachar, Children of a Lesser State: Sustaining Global Inequality Through 
Citizenship Laws, in CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 345, 351 (Stephen Macedo & Iris Marion 
Young eds., 2003) (citing Immigration Act, R.S.C., ch. I-2, § 3 (1985)). 
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questioned.”109  Apparently, birthright citizenship did not come under serious 
debate or consideration until 1994, when the issue was raised for discussion 
before the Canadian Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration.110  
The Standing Committee reported the potential for abuse of birthright 
citizenship, stating that “some women may be coming to Canada as visitors 
solely for the purpose of having their babies on Canadian soil, thereby ensuring 
Canadian citizenship for their children.”111  The Committee subsequently 
recommended that jus soli citizenship be abandoned in favor of a policy that 
grants citizenship only to children of at least one Canadian-citizen parent.112  
Although such recommendations did not develop into any tangible legislation, 
the concerns over abuses of birthright citizenship and proposals for reform 
remained.113 
Jus soli citizenship has continued to receive staunch criticism in recent 
years from politicians, legal experts, and members of the Canadian public.114  
Their concerns, in large part, mirror the concerns of Americans who oppose 
granting birthright citizenship, including the fear “that illegal immigrants in 
Canada are abusing the birthright citizenship law by having children on 
Canadian soil, and then ‘using’ these children to increase their chances of 
staying in the country.”115 
In the Canadian Supreme Court case of Baker v. Canada, the court dealt 
with a situation very similar to that of Elvira Arellano.116  A woman with 
Canadian-born children was ordered deported, but she petitioned for an 
exemption “based upon humanitarian and compassionate considerations,” 
specifically the effect that her deportation would have on her children.117  The 
court noted that although immigration officers should be impartial and free 
from bias, their decision should include “sensitivity and understanding”118 and 
should consider the various hardships that a deportee might face if forced to 
 
 109. Sarah Buhler, Babies as Bargaining Chips? In Defence of Birthright Citizenship in 
Canada, 17 J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 87, 95 (2002). 
 110. Id. at 96 (citing Margaret Young, Canadian Citizenship Act and Current Issues (Ottawa: 
Parliamentary Research Branch, 1998), available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-
R/LoPBdP/BP/bp445-e.htm). 
 111. Id. (quoting Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Canadian Citizenship: 
A Sense of Belonging 17 (Ottawa: Pub. Works and Gov’t Servs. Can., 1994)); Margaret Young, 
Canadian Citizenship Act and Current Issues (Ottawa: Parliamentary Research Branch, 1998), 
available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp445-e.htm. 
 112. Buhler, supra note 109, at 96. 
 113. See id. at 96–97. 
 114. Id. at 88. 
 115. Id. at 88–89 (footnote omitted). 
 116. [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 (Can.), available at http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1999/1999 
rcs2-817/1999rcs2-817.pdf. 
 117. Id. at 825–26. 
 118. Id. at 849–50. 
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return to her home country.119  Officers should also consider the “interests and 
needs of children” because “[c]hildren’s rights, and attention to their interests, 
are central humanitarian and compassionate values in Canadian society.”120 
The court in Baker demonstrated “an increased respect” for Canadian-born 
children of illegal immigrants.121  Although several cases following the Baker 
decision have indicated that the effect of an illegal parent’s deportation on her 
citizen-children is irrelevant in making the decision to deport,122 those 
opposing birthright citizenship fear the Baker decision reflects an ever-
increasing problem in Canadian immigration law that makes it easier for illegal 
immigrants to abuse the system.123 
Some suggest that this shift in Canadian sentiment toward restriction of 
birthright citizenship reflects a worldwide trend of nations moving “toward 
more nationalistic and ethnically-defined identities”124 out of the pressure 
stemming from ever-increasing global migration.125  As immigrants continue 
to flock to more affluent nations, these countries respond by enacting policies 
and laws that make it more difficult for immigrants to obtain citizenship.126  
Canadian proponents of birthright citizenship, however, contend that 
abolishing the policy would unfairly punish innocent children as a way to 
“‘teach’ their immigrant parents to follow Canada’s immigration rules.”127  
Proponents insist that any fair immigration policy must look beyond the 
simplified statistics and criminality of illegal immigration and consider the 
economic and political context in which the illegal immigration most often 
occurs.128  “[M]orally blameless children” should not be used as legislative 
pawns to punish parents “whose only ‘crime’ . . . is to have contravened 
Canada’s immigration laws in a socio-economic context that leaves them 
feeling that there is no other option.”129 
The parallel between the Canadian situation and the recent controversy 
over birthright citizenship in the United States is clear.  It is interesting to note 
that when faced with increasing numbers of births to illegal immigrant 
mothers, many Canadians responded with a call to abolish unconditional jus 
soli citizenship.  Undoubtedly, proponents of this view recognize that abuse of 
 
 119. Id. at 862. 
 120. Id. at 860. 
 121. Buhler, supra note 109, at 93. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at 94. 
 124. Id. at 100 (citing Canadian Council for Refugees, Statelessness—Addressing the Issues, 
Nov. 1996, http://www.web.net/~ccr/statelss.htm). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Buhler, supra note 109, at 100. 
 127. Id. at 101. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. 
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birthright citizenship can only be sufficiently remedied by a change in the law 
itself and not through an unfair policy that punishes citizen-children by forcing 
them to be deported with their illegal immigrant parents. 
B. Australia 
1. Current Law 
The Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 is the preeminent legislation 
governing citizenship in Australia.130  The Act confers citizenship based on jus 
soli, jus sanguinis, adoption, and by grant.131  Unconditional jus soli was the 
position in Australia concerning birthright citizenship until a reform in 1986 
declared that in order for a child born in Australia to be granted citizenship at 
birth, the parent must be an Australian citizen or permanent resident, or have 
been a resident for ten years at the time of the birth.132 
2. Elimination of Unconditional Jus Soli Citizenship 
a. Large-Scale Migration Program 
Apparently, jus soli was “abandoned for a specific reason.”133  The 
Australian government began to make deep, structural changes to raise the 
country’s naturalization rates.134  After World War II, Australia began a large-
scale effort to recruit immigrants and create “one of the most culturally diverse 
countries in the world.”135  The government began to view the acquisition of 
 
 130. Australian Citizenship Act, 1948; see Gianna Zappalà & Stephen Castles, Citizenship 
and Immigration in Australia, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING 
WORLD, supra note 36, at 32, 42–43.  Although the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 was 
recently replaced by the Australian Citizenship Act of 2007, the following discussion concerning 
Australian citizenship is still relatively current, as the relevant provisions remain largely 
unchanged, particularly the abandonment of unconditional jus soli.  See Australian Citizenship 
Act, 2007, § 12(1)(a)-(b). 
 131. Zappalà & Castles, supra note 130, at 43–44. 
 132. Bernard Ryan, The Celtic Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in Ireland, 
6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 173, 176 (2004) (citing Australian Citizenship Act, 1948, § 10(2) (as 
amended)); see also Australian Dep’t of Immigration and Citizenship, Fact Sheet 17 - New 
Zealanders in Australia, http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/17nz.htm (last visited Dec. 
15, 2008). 
 133. Kim Rubenstein, Citizenship and the Centenary: Inclusion and Exclusion in 20th Century 
Australia, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 576, 588 (2000). 
 134. Klusmeyer, supra note 93, at 15–16.  Authors Gianni Zappalà and Stephen Castles argue 
that naturalization rates increased because the structural changes made by the government 
properly addressed a bias in Australian laws toward British citizens.  See id. at 16; Zappalà & 
Castles, supra note 130, at 38–40. 
 135. Zappalà & Castles, supra note 130, at 33; see also Klusmeyer, supra note 93, at 15. 
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citizenship as essential to immigrants’ integration into Australian society.136  
After naturalization rates remained low and stagnant in the 1950s and 1960s, 
the “government gradually introduced measures to reduce administrative 
complexity, lower fees, and simplify procedures.”137  Although these efforts 
were accurately aimed at many problems surrounding low naturalization rates 
in Australia at the time, these efforts proved insufficient to significantly boost 
naturalization rates.138 
“By the end of the 1960s, the government finally began to realize that 
discrimination against immigrants and the failure to take their needs into 
account was a major deterrent that discouraged migrants from seeking to 
become Australian citizens.”139  The government began focusing on policies 
that would “make newcomers feel welcome” and “accommodate the 
immigrants’ own distinct interests and heritages,” including eliminating special 
privileges and exemptions for British immigrants that had, whether actually or 
symbolically, reflected Australia’s “self-understanding as ethnically 
British.”140  One commentator attributes the rise in naturalization rates in the 
1970s to these deeper structural changes that allowed Australia to move from 
an exclusivist mentality to active promotion of multicultural diversity.141  By 
1991, “70 percent of eligible overseas-born residents were Australian 
citizens.”142 
b. The End of Jus Soli 
As a result of “one of the world’s largest migration programs,” residents’ 
resentment toward illegal immigrants began to rise and “[i]mposing a notion of 
‘belonging’ . . . became increasingly tenuous.”143  In the case of Kioa v. 
West,144 it was argued that a child who was born in Australia to parents who 
were temporary entrants to Australia and subject to a deportation order was an 
Australian citizen “entitled to natural justice.”145  The court rejected this view, 
and the Australian government responded with a change in citizenship 
legislation to prevent such an “abuse of citizenship to obtain an immigration 
 
 136. Klusmeyer, supra note 93, at 15; see also Zappalà & Castles, supra note 130, at 35. 
 137. Klusmeyer, supra note 93, at 15. 
 138. Id. at 15–16. 
 139. Id. at 16. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Zappalà & Castles, supra note 130, at 48. 
 143. Id. at 39. 
 144. (1985) 159 C.L.R. 550. 
 145. Rubenstein, supra note 133, at 588; see also MARY CROCK, IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE 
LAW IN AUSTRALIA 26–27 (1998) (discussing the Kioa case and the arguments raised about the 
court’s failure to “consider adequately the interests of the Australian-born children”). 
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advantage.”146  The Australian Citizenship Council, which supported removal 
of jus soli citizenship, argued that “[i]n an international environment where 
population movements are increasing exponentially,” countries like Australia 
are “seen by many as a desirable destination.”147  Granting Australian 
citizenship to children born in Australia to temporary or illegal entrants would 
circumvent immigration laws, would “compromise Australia’s migration 
program,” and would be “inequitable to the many thousands of people who 
apply to migrate to Australia every year through proper channels.”148 
As a resolution, the Australian government amended the Australian 
Citizenship Act of 1948 to prevent future challenges from illegal immigrants 
who had given birth while in Australia.149  As a result, children born in 
Australia to illegal immigrant parents are not entitled to Australian citizenship 
at birth.150  Instead, children born in Australia on or after August 20, 1986 to 
illegal immigrant parents may become Australian citizens upon their tenth 
birthday if they have resided in Australia for the ten years since their birth.151  
However, illegal non-citizen parents still have no right to citizenship or to 
remain in the country simply by virtue of the citizenship status of their 
children.152 
Similar to the situation in Canada, Australia experienced an exponential 
influx of immigrants, although the increase was caused in large part by efforts 
of the Australian government.  Also similar to the Canadian experience, many 
Australians began to resent immigrants who were viewed as abusing 
citizenship rights.  Australian officials, however, went a step further than 
officials in Canada by actually eliminating unconditional birthright citizenship 
from their laws. 
 
 146. Rubenstein, supra note 133, at 588–89. 
 147. Id. at 589 (quoting AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP COUNCIL, AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP FOR 
A NEW CENTURY (2000)). 
 148. Id. (quoting AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP COUNCIL, AUSTRALIAN CITIZENSHIP FOR A NEW 
CENTURY (2000)). 
 149. Zappalà & Castles, supra note 130, at 43. 
 150. Id.; CROCK, supra note 145, at 52 (citing Australian Citizenship Act, 1948, §§ 10–15).  
This provision remains the same in the 2007 Act.  See Australian Citizenship Act, 2007, § 
12(1)(a). 
 151. Zappalà & Castles, supra note 130, at 43 (citing Australian Citizenship Act, 1948, § 
10(2)(b)).  This provision remains the same in the 2007 Act.  See Australian Citizenship Act, 
2007, § 12(1)(b). 
 152. Zappalà & Castles, supra note 130, at 43. 
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C. Ireland 
1. Jus Soli as a Means for Illegal Immigrant Parents to Resist 
Deportation 
The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1935 provided that anyone 
born in Ireland on or after December 6, 1922 was considered a “natural-born 
citizen[]” and granted unconditional jus soli.153  Unconditional jus soli “had 
implications for Irish immigration law” by creating the possibility for parents 
of Irish citizen-children to make a legal claim to remain in Ireland simply 
because of their “connection to an Irish citizen.”154  Article 41 of the Irish 
Constitution further strengthens this possibility, recognizing the family as “the 
natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society and as a moral 
institution possessing inalienable . . . rights . . . superior to all positive law.”155  
In fact, parents of Irish citizens began to invoke Article 41 in the mid-1980s as 
a means to resist deportation.156 
In the 1987 case of Fajujonu v. Minister for Justice,157 the court held that 
Irish citizen-children “had a right to family life which was exercisable in 
Ireland.”158  The court reasoned that where an immigrant has “resided for an 
appreciable time in the State” and has created a family with children who are 
citizens, those children, as Irish citizens, have “a constitutional right to the 
company, care and parentage of their parents within a family unit.”159  
According to the court, citizen-children “are entitled to the care, protection and 
 
 153. Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 1935 (Act No. 13/1935) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.acts.ie/zza13y1935.1.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2008); see also Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 
2, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/Constitution%20of%20 
IrelandNov2004.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2008); Ryan, supra note 132, at 174.  The Irish 
Nationality and Citizenship Act was amended in 1956 to extend birthright citizenship to those 
born in Northern Ireland.  Id. at 174–75.  However, this extension of birthright citizenship to 
Northern Ireland was of little significance, since, for purposes of defining citizenship, the Irish 
Constitution already recognized the “area of jurisdiction” of the Irish Free State as including the 
entire island of Ireland.  Id. at 175.  “Irish law therefore treated the vast majority of persons 
domiciled in Northern Ireland” as Irish citizens.  Id.  The Belfast Agreement of 1998 amended the 
constitution to provide for citizenship as an “entitlement and birthright” of anyone born on the 
island of Ireland.  Id. at 177 (citing Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 2 (as amended)); see also Siobhàn 
Mullally, Citizenship and Family Life in Ireland: Asking the Question ‘Who Belongs’?, 25 LEGAL 
STUD. 578, 580 (2005). 
 154. Ryan, supra note 132, at 179. 
 155. Id. (citing Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 41). 
 156. Id. 
 157. [1989] 2 I.R. 151 (Ir.). 
 158. Ryan, supra note 132, at 180; see also Mullally, supra note 153, at 582–83 (describing 
the court’s emphasis on the importance of family life for Irish citizen-children). 
 159. Ryan, supra note 132, at 180 (quoting Farjujonu, 2 I.R. at 162). 
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society of their parents.”160  The court’s reasoning revealed that a citizen-
child’s “right to family life in Ireland had to be given significant weight in 
decisions taken with respect to their parents.”161  Illegal immigrant parents 
could be deported only if “‘a grave and substantial reason associated with the 
common good’ required such a step.”162  These reasons must be “so 
predominant and so overwhelming” that breaking up a family to deport the 
illegal immigrant parent “is not so disproportionate to the aim sought to be 
achieved as to be unsustainable.”163 
2. Rejection of the ‘Right to Family’ Approach 
For many years, the decision in Fajujonu served as the legal basis for 
acceptance of non-national parents of Irish citizen-children.164  Applications to 
remain in Ireland on the basis of parenthood increased during this time.165  As 
a result, the Department of Justice changed its policy in 2001 to begin refusing 
applications from parents of Irish citizen-children if the family had not been in 
Ireland for an “appreciable time.”166  Courts began deciding cases based on 
“the overriding need to preserve respect for and the integrity of the asylum and 
immigration systems,”167 rather than the familial needs of citizen-children.168  
Some judges reasoned that Irish citizen-children were “incapable of making a 
choice as to residence,” and parents’ entitlement to remain should not be based 
solely on the residence of their children.169 
To reconcile their departure from the decision in Fajujonu, judges argued 
that immigration conditions in Ireland were very different and more 
overwhelming than the conditions in 1989, when Fajujonu was decided.170  
Courts reasoned that the influx of immigration was straining social services, 
and “integrating people from very different ethnic and cultural backgrounds 
into the fabric of Irish society” was increasingly difficult.171  Such a departure 
from the reasoning in Fajujonu was necessary “to respect the integrity of the 
 
 160. Id. (quoting Fajujonu, 2 I.R. at 164). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. (quoting Fajujonu, 2 I.R. at 162). 
 163. Id. (quoting Fajujonu, 2 I.R. at 166); see also Mullally, supra note 153, at 582–83 
(discussing the reasoning of the court in the Fajujonu case). 
 164. Ryan, supra note 132, at 181. 
 165. Id.; see also Mullally, supra note 153, at 583–84 (discussing a Supreme Court case that 
distinguished Fajujonu and argued that any claims made by non-citizen parents on behalf of their 
citizen children “were subject to the exigencies of the common good”). 
 166. Ryan, supra note 132, at 181. 
 167. Id. at 181–82. 
 168. See Mullally, supra note 153, at 583 (describing the increase in the number of 
applications of immigrant parents claiming residency on the basis of their Irish citizen children). 
 169. Ryan, supra note 132, at 182. 
 170. Id. at 184. 
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systems of immigration control.”172  Courts aimed to prevent a legal regime 
that would allow immigrants to use the birth of their children “to circumvent 
the immigration and asylum systems.”173 
3. Abolition of Unconditional Jus Soli 
Although the Irish government supported this shift in policy and responded 
by refusing to accept new applications for residence based solely on parental 
status, there were subsequently “very few deportations of the parents of Irish 
citizen children,”174 and parents continued to immigrate to Ireland and give 
birth within the Irish borders.175  The government began using these 
applications, however, as grounds to initiate a constitutional amendment to 
remove unconditional jus soli completely from the constitution176 “to preserve 
the ‘integrity’ of Irish citizenship.”177  The referendum passed in 2004 by an 
overwhelming majority,178 and provided that those born in Ireland to non-
citizen parents were not entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality.179  One 
commentator argues that Ireland’s abandonment of unconditional jus soli “is 
not unusual when viewed in comparative terms,” since many states 
experiencing significant immigration “often respond by introducing 
restrictions.”180 
Like Canada and Australia, the response in Ireland to an immigration 
influx included an attack on unconditional jus soli citizenship.  However, 
Ireland was arguably responding to a somewhat different problem, paralleled 
in many ways to the immigration debate in the United States.  Irish courts 
began to recognize the importance of the family and the right of the citizen-
child to the care of a parent.  This notion, along with the advantage of jus soli 
citizenship for native-born children, led illegal immigrant parents to apply in 
large numbers to obtain Irish citizenship.  Many apparently perceived such 
“citizenship by proxy” as an abuse of the immigration and citizenship system, 
and jus soli was eliminated as a result. 
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 173. Id. at 185. 
 174. Ryan, supra note 132, at 185. 
 175. Mullally, supra note 153, at 585. 
 176. Ryan, supra note 132, at 187. 
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2008)). 
 180. Id. at 192. 
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D. France 
1. Current Law 
Although citizenship in France is largely based on jus sanguinis principles, 
the citizenship laws are supplemented with substantial elements of jus soli 
citizenship.181  Under current French law, third-generation immigrants are 
automatically granted jus soli citizenship at birth, while second-generation 
immigrants are subject to conditional jus soli, being awarded citizenship upon 
reaching the age of eighteen and proving residence in France for the preceding 
five years, among other conditions.182 
2. Jus Soli Extended to Encourage Assimilation and Civic Duties 
Before jus soli was incorporated in 1889, French citizenship, defined by 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic codifications, was already quite expansive, 
“combining the principles of birthplace, descent, and domicile.”183  The 
Napoleonic Code adopted the principle of jus sanguinis citizenship, but 
Napoleon argued for the inclusion of some elements of jus soli citizenship.184  
He was convinced that the interests of the state demanded that military 
obligations be imposed on citizens.185  Granting French citizenship to the 
children of settled foreigners would allow the French government “to subject 
[them] to conscription and other public obligations.”186  Moreover, Napoleon 
emphasized the fact that French-born children of settled immigrant parents 
“have the French way of thinking, French habits, and the natural attachment 
that everyone has for the country in which he was born.”187 
Critics of jus soli citizenship insisted that France’s citizenship regime 
“reflect an enduring and substantial, not merely an accidental, connection to 
France, and that it reflect the will to belong,” addressing concerns over 
granting citizenship to children born to transient visitors of France, rather than 
 
 181. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 81 
(1992).  Brubaker argues that although French citizenship is based largely on jus sanguinis 
principles, the government supplements its citizenship laws with elements of jus soli principles to 
a larger extent than most other Western European countries following jus sanguinis principles.  
Id.  Brubaker continues by saying that although citizenship laws in France and the United States 
have apparent differences (the former based largely on jus sanguinis and the latter based largely 
on jus soli), “persons born in France [to foreign parents] and residing there at majority have 
French citizenship.”  Id. at 82.  Thus, despite the differences, the end result in the United States 
and France, “as far as second-generation immigrants are concerned,” is similar.  Id. 
 182. Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 128; see also BRUBAKER, supra note 181, at 81. 
 183. BRUBAKER, supra note 181, at 86. 
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 185. Id. at 88. 
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permanent immigrants living in the country.188  Others felt that granting 
citizenship to residents of “foreign origin” would pose a threat to France.189  
Thus, in the final version of the Civil Code, children born in France of foreign 
parents could only claim French citizenship by declaring their intention to stay 
in France or establish their domicile there.190  Such “conditional jus soli” 
prevailed “because it would be too unjust and too ill suited to national dignity 
to confer French citizenship on a person who, although born in France, had 
neither resided in France nor manifested the desire to establish himself 
there.”191  For second-generation immigrants, “the presumption of attachment 
to France was so strong and self-evident that this group is not even mentioned 
in the Civil Code—their citizenship literally went without saying.”192 
However, few persons born in France to foreign parents claimed French 
citizenship.193  This led to resentment among French citizens, who were 
obligated to perform military service, and a view that these foreign citizens 
were gaining the benefits of French society while avoiding any civic 
responsibilities.194  This response was not surprising, considering the 
prevailing view, previously discussed, that military service was necessary to 
achieve state interests and prove civic commitment.195  The fact that “long-
established foreigners” were allowed to remain in their homes “while 
Frenchmen spent up to five years in the barracks” was viewed as a “shocking 
inequality”196 and a potential “impediment to assimilation.”197 
Another, less debated problem was the development of cultural enclaves, 
with immigrant groups, especially Italian immigrant groups, forming close-
knit, isolated cultural communities within French borders.198  Many viewed the 
Italian immigrants’ activities, including forming associations, establishing 
journals, and encouraging Italian nationalism, as “politics of isolation” that 
“challenged the unitarist French political formula.”199  Granting citizenship, 
and thus requiring military service, to native-born children of immigrants was 
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viewed as a means to ensure assimilation and civic commitment among the 
immigrant communities in France,200 and thus prevent disloyalty.201  Thus, jus 
soli was extended to third-generation immigrants in 1851, and conditional jus 
soli was extended to second-generation immigrants in 1889.202 
Such conditional and unconditional distinctions for second- and third-
generation immigrants, respectively, are not surprising when viewed in the 
context of the development of jus soli citizenship in France described above.  
Third-generation immigrants have presumably proven their civic commitment 
to the nation, by virtue of being removed from their ancestor’s homeland by at 
least an entire generation.  These individuals are viewed as “French from the 
point of view of spirit, inclination, habits, and morals.”203  Second-generation 
immigrants are entitled to citizenship, but they face additional hurdles to prove 
their civil commitment since they are not as far removed from their parents’ 
non-French home country. 
Interestingly, unlike Canada, Australia, or Ireland, France responded to 
resentment toward immigrants and their perceived abuses of the French 
citizenship system by actually expanding citizenship laws.  One commentator 
argues that extending citizenship to children of immigrants was somewhat 
illogical in that “resentment of the privileged situation of established 
immigrants [led] to a more inclusive definition of citizenship,” rather than a 
more exclusive approach.204  He argues that, at the time jus soli became the 
policy in France, French society and government’s “distinctively state-centered 
and assimilationist understanding[s] of nationhood, deeply rooted in political 
and cultural geography,” largely determined their notion of what was in the 
best interest of the state.205  Those shaping policy in France began to view the 
exclusion of citizenship to native-born children of immigrants “as anomalous 
and intolerable.”206  Instead, the “civic and military incorporation” of the 
children of immigrants was viewed “as natural and necessary.”207  Permitting 
French-born children of immigrants to claim French citizenship was intended 
“to expand and strengthen the nation, not to dilute its ethnocultural 
substance.”208 
 
 200. BRUBAKER, supra note 181, at 108; see also id. at 152 (referring to the granting of 
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IV.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM CANADA, AUSTRALIA, IRELAND, AND FRANCE: 
PROPOSING A SOLUTION 
This Comment in no way intends to propose an extremely well-considered 
solution to the problem of birthright citizenship and de facto deportation of 
citizen-children born to illegal immigrant parents.  The following suggestions 
for reform of birthright citizenship do not include a well-examined or well-
researched assessment of the potential consequences, costs, or implications for 
such a reform of birthright citizenship.  Instead, this Comment merely 
emphasizes that any approach taken by the U.S. government must not only 
consider the practical consequences of de facto deportation, but must also 
consider the experiences and reactions of countries with similar laws and 
similar immigration issues. 
The previous discussion of the treatment of jus soli citizenship in Canada, 
Australia, and Ireland contains a general theme: when faced with an 
exponential influx of immigrants and subsequent “anchor baby” births, these 
nations have responded by abolishing unconditional jus soli from the nations’ 
laws.  Although Canada has yet to officially reject jus soli, the arguments in 
favor of abolishing it seem to remain.  Apparently, the solution in Canada, 
Australia, and Ireland to an increasing number of “anchor babies” is to 
disallow children of illegal immigrants to obtain citizenship automatically at 
birth. 
In contrast, France responded to similar immigration problems by 
expanding citizenship laws.  It appears that the goal was to facilitate 
assimilation and civic attachment, and thereby decrease resentment from 
native-born Frenchmen.  More importantly, the French method of granting 
citizenship may serve as a model for revising America’s citizenship laws 
without abolishing birthright citizenship completely.  To negate concerns over 
granting citizenship to children of migrants simply “passing through,” the 
French Civil Code grants citizenship to second-generation immigrants only 
upon reaching the age of majority and by establishing their domicile in France.  
Third-generation immigrants still enjoy unconditional jus soli citizenship at 
birth. 
It seems plausible that such a system could be established in the United 
States.  Instead of revoking jus soli citizenship completely, legislators could 
simply place conditions on second-generation immigrants’ birthright 
citizenship.  Without changing current jus sanguinis citizenship and 
naturalization processes, the United States could amend unconditional jus soli 
to require that the parent lawfully reside in the United States for a number of 
years, or that the child reside in the United States for a number of years and 
reach the age of majority before citizenship is conferred.  Such a system may 
decrease the number of illegal immigrant births and resolve the problem of de 
facto deportation, since illegal immigrant parents would no longer have an 
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automatic claim to U.S. residency simply by virtue of their child’s citizenship 
status.  If birth alone does not bestow citizenship, “there is less concern that 
undocumented migrants may try to ‘manufacture’ equity by having 
children.”209 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer are authors and 
researchers who, as part of the Comparative Citizenship Project of the 
Carnegie Endowment’s International Migration Policy Program, have 
extensively investigated and compared citizenship policies in liberal-
democratic states that have experienced large-scale immigration.210  They have 
proposed a similar approach to citizenship classification that would utilize 
generations as the category of analysis.211  They recommend that third-
generation foreign nationals be entitled to citizenship at birth, while second-
generation foreign nationals acquire citizenship from a modified jus soli 
rule.212  Second-generation immigrants could acquire citizenship if they satisfy 
two requirements: birth in the territory and either residence of the child for a 
number of years prior to adulthood or lawful residence of the parent.213  In 
either case, whether citizenship is granted based on the child’s residence in the 
state for a period of time or based on the parent’s lawful residence in the 
state,214 such a birthright citizenship regime will presumably negate any attack 
on the child’s tenuous relation to the state in which he is granted citizenship. 
CONCLUSION 
De facto deportation of citizen-children is an undeniable result of the 
deportation of illegal immigrant parents.  Despite arguments that the child may 
be free to return to “reclaim” his citizenship status, such a practice leaves the 
child with two undesirable choices.  It forces the child either to relocate to 
another country and stay with his parent or to remain in the United States and 
suffer the consequences of having his parent deported.  The United States 
simply cannot continue the practice of birthright citizenship simultaneously 
with its current policy of deporting illegal immigrant parents with little regard 
for the citizenship status of their children.  Unlimited jus soli citizenship must 
be abandoned in favor of a system that delays the grant of citizenship rights for 
children of illegal immigrants until the parent or child satisfy a number of 
prerequisites.  These prerequisites should generally be aimed at encouraging 
children to establish relationships with the United States beyond simply their 
birth within U.S. borders. 
 
 209. ALEINIKOFF & KLUSMEYER, supra note 42, at 12. 
 210. See Klusmeyer, supra note 93, at 2. 
 211. ALEINIKOFF & KLUSMEYER, supra note 42, at 7–8. 
 212. Id. at 8, 12. 
 213. Id. at 12. 
 214. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
246 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:219 
Since immigration woes are undoubtedly not uniquely American, 
lawmakers should consider the approaches taken by other western democratic 
states in establishing a workable and fair immigration and citizenship system.  
Australia and Ireland reacted to immigrant influxes and “anchor baby” births 
by abolishing unconditional jus soli citizenship in favor of jus sanguinis 
models.  Similarly, strong arguments exist in Canada to do the same.  France 
reacted by establishing a conditional jus soli citizenship regime, which this 
Comment references as a potential workable solution for the United States.  
Whatever the solution, birthright citizenship for children of illegal immigrants 
simply cannot coexist with the current U.S. policy of deporting illegal 
immigrant parents. 
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